ISIS Are Among Us: From Puppets in The Hands Of The Government To Rebels Against It (2)
2014-11-18 - 2:16 ص
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by Husain Marhoon: All eyes have turned towards Bahrain as news emerged about Bahraini citizens drifting through the current of fiery events in the Middle East, with the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known as "ISIS" taking the spotlight after seizing swathes of land in Iraq and Syria. Reports from both these countries have shown that there is a considerable rise in participation of Bahraini Jihadists1 in the terrorist group's operations, which has announced the establishment of an "Islamic caliphate". About 7 Bahrainis were killed this year, 2014, in ISIS ranks along with six others who died in 2012 and 2013, during battles alongside offshoot extremist groups such as "Nusra Front". Thus, the total number of Bahrainis killed since foreign militants began to join fighting in Syria and Iraq reached thirteen.2
It seemed noteworthy what Jihadi websites mentioned about a Bahraini's death in a targeted airstrike in Iraq (October 14th 2014). It was Ahmad Abdurrahman Shihab Ahmad Shihab, nicknamed as Abdurrahman Al-Sharqi, who was already added to the United States' blacklist in 2012.He was one of the influential leaders in Al-Qaeda, as he was in charge of the foreign affairs of Afghanistan's Al-Qaeda, i.e. similar to a "foreign minister".
On February 28th of this year, Jihadi social media accounts celebrated the arrival of Turki Al-Binali (30 years old) to Syria via Iraq, after tweeting "Heading to Jihad in Syria" on his Twitter account.
Only a few weeks passed before it was revealed that he held a high-rank position in ISIS leadership; for he represents one of the three sides of the "Legitimate Triangle" responsible for issuing the group's Fatwas, alongside Abu Bakr Al-Qahtani (Saudi) and Othman Al Nazeh Al-Osayri (Saudi).Cole Bunzel, a PhD candidate at Princeton, described him as "the Islamic State'smost effective voice."
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Ahmad Shihab, head of Al-Qaeda’s foreign affairs in Afghanistan |
The significance that Binali, who comes from a clan having close ties to the Al Khalifa Bahraini ruling family along which it traveled from Al-Zabara to Bahrain in 1783, has in the ranks of the extremist organization was underlined after his appearance (in July 2014) in a video, showing him teaching worshipers in one of the mosques of Syria's ISIS-controlled Raqqa province, the pledge of allegiance to the Baghdadi, who declared himself the "Prince of Believers."
As many of Al-Binali's publications gained popularity, the magnitude of his influence within the group's intellectual network emerged, some of which are: "Raise your hands to pledge allegiance to Al-Baghdadi" (2013)3, "Obligations of joining the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (2013),"The permissibility of declaring the caliphate before the achievement of full political capability" (2014), "Wording of Al-Adnani interpretation: The Islamic State catapult" (2014),"Demonstrating the arguments showing the difference between the men of the Islamic State and the Kharijites" (2014), "Brief statement on requesting the emirate rule" (2014), and other works which he published after his arrival to Syria.
His great intellectual influence within the ranks of the new group of Jihadists joining ISIS caught the attention of prominent theorists in the Jihadi Salafi movement, such as Abu Qatada Al-Filistini and his leader Asem Al-Barqawi, known as Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdesi, Omar Al-Hadoushi, Hani Al-Siba'i, Tariq Abdulhalim, Abu Basir Al-Tartusi, Adam Ghaddan and Iyad Qenaybi, who reacted to his rising fame with reservation. Then they distributed publications in different times of this year, contesting and renouncing him. They blame him for many actions committed by ISIS, which they consider have "marred the image of Islam and Jihad".
Nonetheless, none of them were able to put an end to Al-Binali's power, who seemed to have cut all links to his previous Sheikhs (i.e. mentors) of "Jihadist ideology", inclining towards another new version he has originated.
He "inked" responses, regarded as extremely self-centered4 and arrogant. This could be seen in his response to Abu Qatada in his publication, entitled "The Benefits of refuting Abu Qatada" (April 29th 2014). Commenting on the latter's statement, describing ISIS militants as "Dogs of Hell", he said "I see that Sheikh Abu Qatada Al-Filistini following these remarks of his-if proven- should be treated as misled scholars are treated (...) He has been misled after entering prison, so his Fatwas issued before he was misled-which conform with the truth-are accepted and the ones issued after that are not".
He responded as well to his mentor Al-Maqdesi to whom he owes his position as Mufti in "The Tawhid and Jihad Platform" and as his successor in the "Fatwa Committee", as he claims, saying in his book entitled "My former Sheikh, we now go our separate ways" (May 31st 2014), "You are contesting and renouncing me without any reason! Today's Abu Sufyan is the same as yesterday's, as for my allegiance to the Islamic State, it is not something new (...) your stance towards it has, however, changed. So why the change of heart!".
"Jihadists" Subject to the Authority
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Abu Laden Al-Bahraini displaying his practice of beheading |
Bahraini security forces have always boasted in front of foreign diplomats having control over the extremist Sunni ideology, which they depend on in order to build a wall of "ethnic segregation" to shun calls for democratic change.
The events of February 14th 2011 represent a perfect workshop for testing the level of the authority's efficacy in investing the policies of control and programming in favor of "extremist Sunni groups". Reviewing the positions taken by the "Jihadist movement's" two pillars in the Bahraini arena, Turki Al-Binali himself and Sheikh Adel Hassan Al-Hamad, the level of compliance to policies of "control" adopted by the authorities is shown. Here, we exclude from the examination, conventional Sunni movements, like Al-Asala Salafist group, the Brotherhood and the Assembly of National Unity, whose reconciliation with the authorities is an undisputable matter.
Al-Binali drew a stance from the February 14 events, conforming greatly to the government's propaganda. A video of him dating back to March 15th 2011, one day before Saudi-backed Bahraini forces evacuated Pearl Square from protesters, shows to what extent he was involved in pro-government rallies, which represented a protective shield for the Busaiteen, which is a Sunni stronghold in eastern Manama, on the eve of what was known as the "Busaiteen girl incident". Activists posted a video showing a pro-regime young woman running over a protester in the financial harbor neighborhood. State-run media outlets began to spread a rumor that the Shiites are planning to take revenge.
In response to that, Al-Binali stood upon a platform during a pro-government rally, where demonstrators carried pictures of King Hamad along with swords and canes, and delivered a speech, saying: "Whoever assaults you, assault him as he assaulted you".
In an improvised speech, entitled "Guiding and aiding Sunnis and Tawhid", he went on to say, amid chants of "Allah is Great" and pro-regime slogans, "If we defend the honor of our women, our money, our roles and ourselves, then we are doing so to please Allah, the Almighty".
Although Al-Binali issued a statement in which he declared that "the government has associated partners with God by its rule and judiciary" as "Rafidis (Shiites) associated partners with God by their worship and rituals", he didn't mind supporting its security measures taken against the opposition. He even denounced what he described as leniency on the part of the government opposed to its strictness that it exercises on its "own kin" meaning the Sunnis.
He also expressed in an article, entitled "Between Qurmozi verses and Qur'anic verses" which he posted on a special forum linked to the "Al-Binali" clan (July 14th 2014), his extreme opposition to the authorities' release of the poet Ayat Al-Qurmozi, who was thrown in jail for three months over a poem she wrote that ridiculed the prime minister. "Today, we are seeing and witnessing: that sentences are being implemented against the most honorable people of righteousness and religion, while exempting the most dishonorable, the lowest and most despicable people," she said.
In this context, he added that "the worthless, shameless people criticize who they please, whenever they please and by any means they please, without being watched or held accountable, while all eyes are cast towards the kin. The shackles of steel are for the Sunnis and people of Tawhid, yet the family of Qurmos and the sons of Kesra and Hormoz are granted amnesty and wellbeing, and are treated with utter friendliness!"
Al-Binali admits as well that there are "common interests" with the government; for if those who are aggrieved are the Shiites, then "let Allah punish the oppressor by another oppressor."
He also says in a statement, entitled "Guidance of couchant lions if the rulers clash with the Rafidis" (2011), "We shall not advocate the Rafidis against the apostate rulers, and we shall not advocate the apostate rulers against the Rafidis. Let Allah punish the oppressors by other oppressors, unless one of them aims his rifle towards the Sunni public, then we shall stop him, even if it benefited the other party, because this is a matter of met interests between different camps".
A "Jihadist" who has never mentioned "his oppressor"
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(R to L) Turki Al-Binali and Ali Al-Roway’i, nicknamed “” Abu Hamza Al-Bahraini |
Since Al-Binali refrained from overtly issuing statements critical of the government during his stay in Bahrain, he was taken out from the circle of Al-Qaeda theorists linked to Al-Zawahiri. Doubts were also raised over why the Bahraini authorities turned a blind eye to his activities, despite his claims that he was pursued.
The extremist preacher Tariq Abdulhalim (April 30th 2014) said: "Where is this shameless man who encroached upon, the religion of Ibrahim; he has not uttered a word against his oppressor and leader the king of Bahrain to this day." "Al-Binali travels across the world, safely and securely. Why not? For he has never mentioned, by name, his oppressor until this day, until this moment, not a single bad word, even when he gained prominence in Syria," he added.
The truth is that Al-Binali previously worked as a religious education school teacher in Bahraini official schools (Omar Bin Abdelaziz School in Al-Hala city); over the past four years, which clearly assures that he was moving about smoothly in the country.
He has traveled to Libya as well following the fall of Gadhafi's regime. Many videos uploaded to YouTube shows his meetings with Jihadists in the city of Sert, where he delivered a series of lectures. He also flew to Morocco in order to preach and to Abyan in Yemen when Al-Qaeda militants gained control over some of its regions.He traveled to Syria at least twice since the launch of battles at the end of August 2013. His published messages in the first months of 2013, which he uses to finish with the phrase "The blessed land of the Levant." He returned to Bahrain before announcing his final travel to the "State of the caliphate" in February 2014.
Even after being banned from entering some Arab countries in preceding years, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, he still had the freedom to travel from and to Bahrain until the beginning of 2014.
It wasn't limited to his freedom to travel, he also freely expressed again and time again his inclination to Al-Qaeda. Al-Binali himself also admits in an article under an alias5 holding his stamp mark (October 20th 2013), in response to a series of accusations, that he "on the level of Gulf countries, there is some sort of freedom in Bahrain and Kuwait which doesn't exist in the UAE and Saudi Arabia." He then explains why the authorities overlooked his activities, saying that "since the Shiite revolution in Bahrain was launched, the Bahraini government focused all of its efforts and arrows towards the Shiites, and turned a blind eye to the activities of the followers of this movement, including Sheikh Turki Al-Binali, and this is what some people don't understand."
This explanation is absolutely in accordance with the fact that the authorities refrained from questioning him about his appearances in rallies where Al-Qaeda flags were carried and his close connections to the leaders of "The global Jihadi movement" which he explicitly speaks of in his publications.
Turki Al-Binali mentioned in one of his messages an incident holding significant indications that is when he interceded for a Christian in Saudi Arabia who was caught by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, after receiving a request from his leader Al-Maqdesi. In this respect, he stated: "By Allah, if my Sheikh (leader) told me to free an army of Christians, I would have done that for him. The group leaders released him because of that."
In another incident, Al-Binali made a speech in a pro-government rally (September 14th 2012) outside the US embassy in Manama, protesting the production of a movie by an American citizen of Egyptian origin, a "Coptic", which was deemed insulting to the Prophet. He spoke before masked protesters, carrying Al-Qaeda flags and chanting: "Obama, Obama, we are all Osama today." He warned that " it is not acceptable to claim that you are criticizing what the Americans are doing by insulting the Prophet, and then not follow the Sharia."
In 2012, Al-Binali welcomed the preacher Al-Hajaj Al-Ajami, who was added to the list of funders of terrorism in Iraq and Syria by the UN Security Council and US Treasury Department in August 2014, in his home in the Busaiteen, for the purpose of raising money for foreign fighters in Syria.The "Al-Hayat" newspaper which is close to the Saudi royal family, revealed in a report in advance (February 25th 2013) that "one of the most prominent leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant organization is a Bahraini known as Abu Hammam Al-Athri." At that time, he hadn't yet announced that he was leaving Bahrain.
It doesn't seem that Al-Binali was questioned about any of these activities. The last interrogation he was subjected to, which he himself admitted, dates back to 2007, in regard to what was known as the "Saqeefa cell" with which he was accused of issuing Takfiri statements. He was then released after talks with Salafi Sheikhs having close ties with the Saudi religious institution, which the prison officers organized for him.
Adel Al-Hamad: You and I with the king
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- Sheikh Adil Al Hamad |
The preacher Sheikh Adel Hassan Al-Hamad, who delivers weekly lectures in "Al-Nosf" mosque in Al-Riffa, is the other pillar representing the local Jihadi movement. He is considered a clearer proof of the submission of the Jihadi movement symbols in Bahrain to the policies of control drawn by the government.
There seems to be no difference between the approach of Al-Hamad on the Bahraini crisis since 2011 and Al-Binali's approach, which is parallel to the approach declared by the government to contain the protests about which state-run media outlets talked 24\7. He; however, is more engrossed by the government's approach as there are "systematic" differences between both in the Jihadist ideology-which we will discuss in the next part-.
Al-Hamad assumed in advance that "There are foreign hands managing the event". In a lecture (February 13th 2011) before the events were launched, he said that "the goal is the downfall of the regime (...) It is not a matter of political demands. The purpose is to eliminate the Sunnis and cause a sedition." Thereafter, he ended his speech by praying for security forces that "may Allah grant them success so they would be able to have an iron grip this time so that no abolishers would dare to raise their heads anymore."
In another speech delivered on February 27th 2011, he said: "I greatly thank the security forces who did their duty of eradicating those causing sedition. They indeed are our shield; they protect us all from the corrupters of this world. Expressing our appreciation to them is the least we could do, for they are the ones who deserve appreciation and praise the most."
The progress of events has shown that there is a development in Al-Hamad's adoption of the language used by Bahraini officials; he is just like all the other pro-regime Sunni groups. His approach included adopting a fierce language urging to take action against protesters; also calling for firing employees and teachers, stripping Shiites of their rights and demolishing mosques and wiping out funerals, in a manner even more extremist than the government's. This was revealed as well in a number of speeches he gave, commenting on the events.
During a speech he delivered on the 4th of March 2011, he stated: "If our king wants his rule to last, he must cherish the Sunnis because they represent the nation and all others are just people causing sedition. The king can't do anything by himself, we must stand by him. The people, meaning the Sunnis, must strive to protect their country from falling."
"This event is a battle between the truth and falsehood, between people who have never changed their position of being hostile towards the Sunnis. The battle with these people is based on the difference in the principles of religion, yet some people still think that these vile people are the majority," he stated in another speech delivered on March 18th 2011.
He also said in an address on March 25th 2011 that "some people wonder these days why we treat these people this way after Allah degraded the people of corruption who are beginning to return to their jobs defeated." He also stressed that "if we want to deal with them, we must first categorize them (...) Yes, they are infidels, but what suits them best is describing them as hypocrites, we are speaking of the highest level of hypocrisy. These are the most hypocritical people; they show that they are Muslims but in reality they conceal their infidelity."
He then explains that "hypocrites perform Jihad with swords and weapons (...) We shouldn't show them mercy, we should be strict. Our jurisprudence teaches us to treat them this way. They cannot join the army or any military institution. They mustn't be given any position higher than the believers'. This is not a political issue. It is the Sharia;" adding that "funeral homes were only built to cause division amongst Muslims. If this were a country calling for Tawhid, they wouldn't have a place in this country. Their mosques and funeral homes are all destined to destruction. We don't demolish churches, but we demolish funeral homes because they are built to destroy the religion."
In another speech delivered on April 1st 2011, he said: "If we wanted to face the Rafidis in our country, we must fight their wickedness, so we must deal with this issue according to the principle of religion. Most of the relations with them are made because we go to the same schools and universities and work in the same places, and this is forbidden. Rafidis are worse than immoral people who openly show their infidelity." He then goes on to say that "if we exposed their plots and arrested some of the Rafidi leaders, this doesn't mean that the problem is over (...) We need to continue to fight them according to the Sharia."
In the same context, he said in an address in April 15th 2011 that "they say they are citizens. No brother, they shouldn't be called citizens at all. They are the enemy, even if they live on the same land. Political change is not linked to enmity. It is linked to religion," adding that "No matter where they are, in prison or not. These people only belong in one place, underground, to rot with magnets and black ants."
These references shed light on how much the programming tactics used by the government are effective. Since the start, they have described the protests as a "Shiite event", which was also propagated by Jihadist preachers "in external arenas" trying to differentiate themselves from pro-government groups and distancing themselves from the system of interests which conventional Salafi movements are characterized by. Therefore, Sheikh Al-Hamad will not hesitate to use religious texts and "program" it to serve the "programmer", who is the regime, as if the Bahraini government would replace the Taliban rule whose speech reached the level of the desired Utopia; "The rule of Islam was only truly implemented when Taliban ruled."
These examples; however, prove that the policies of having "control" over extremist groups, cannot continue for a long time. The video of four extremist Bahrainis affiliated with ISIS recorded this year (September 28th 2014), entitled "Message to the Sunnis of Bahrain" is an example of a rebellious action against the regime and its policies of control.
Mohammed Abdallah, nicknamed as "Abu Issa Al-Silmi", who defected from the Bahraini ministry of interior, said in a statement, with which he addressed his fellow soldiers "Soldiers, you must know that you are the ones protecting and reinforcing the rule of the infidels. If you like it or not, you are still an accomplice in their oppression practiced against the servants of Allah." Thereafter, he ends his statement by calling those who work for the security forces to repent "Join the caravan of repentant leaders of believers as Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, Abu Hafs Al-Misri and Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi."
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Picture of Abdulrahman, son of Jihadi preacher Adel Al-Hamad before he died in Syria |
In response to the threats of Bahraini authorities on March 28th 2014 to strip the Bahrainis who are involved in battles outside the country of their nationalities, Salam Al-Turki, who is a Bahraini militant affiliated with ISIS, challenged them by saying: "You poor things! Don't you know that we, who are part of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, have thrown away our citizenships! Don't you know that we have disclaimed them! Don't you know that you, your nationality, your laws and constitutions are beneath our feet," according to the original text of his videotaped address (May 17th 2014).
The main, deeply meaningful purpose, nevertheless, is the one that Abdulrahman, the son of Sheikh Adel Al-Hamad himself, stated in a comment he posted on his page on social media outlet, Twitter, weeks before his death. He said: "I am with the upcoming gulf revolution." He then expressed his views that showed how deeply he detests both royal families in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, as experience has shown in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, you can have control over extremist groups temporarily. You mustn't be too confident though: for their revolt is just a matter of time.
Read in the next part:
- The division of Bahraini extremists in the "civil Jihadi war" into two camps, one loyal to "Al-Joulani" and the other to "Al-Baghdadi"
- The journey of Bahraini Jihadists from "Nusra Front" to "ISIS" with the majority agreeing "with the king" as long as he is killing the Shiites-
The revolt against old "Jihad" relations.."Al-Binali" renounces "Al-Zawahiri" after his call to stop targeting Shiites
- "Al-Hamad" quarrels with the "Islamic State" and remains devoted to "Al-Qaeda"..and "Jihad" ...be prepared for it in Bahrain
Also read this : (1) ISIS Are Among Us: Peculiar Transition in Al-Asala Society Tactics
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Foot notes :
1.We recognize that the use of "Jihadi" to designate Salafis of a militant stripe is controversial. Some analysts feel that it cedes too much to militant Salafis to ratify their use of the term-they call their movement al-haraka al-jihadiyya ("the Jihadi Movement")-since jihad has positive connotations in Islam. Thus, it is useful to explain that we adopt the viewpoint of the authors of "The Militant Ideology Atlas" on which we are basing this note. The authors state that they opted to use the term for the following reasons. First, it has wide currency in the Western counterterrorism community. Second, the proposed alternatives are either too imprecise or polemically charged to be analytically useful. Third, "Jihadism" indicates the centrality of religious warfare in the militant Salafi worldview. Fourth, using the label makes Jihadis accountable for giving the term a bad name and for not living up to the high standard of conduct associated with jihad. Finally, the term is used in Arab media, hostile to the ideology, so it is not a Western neologism.
2.List of Bahrainis killed, until October 2014: Abdurrahman Adel Al-Hamad, Abdulaziz Al-Othman- Abdurrahman Al-Othman, Abdulmenen Ali, Ibrahim Mohyideen Khan, Ali Al-Roway'I, nicknamed as "Abu Hamza Al-Bahraini", Abdullah Jamal Al-Muhayza', nicknamed as "Abu Al-Zubayr Al-Bahraini and "Abu Jameel", Yosuf Jameel Al-Bahraini, Abu Mo'tasem Al-Bahraini, Abdurrahman Al-Sharqi, known as "Ahmad Shihab", Ibrahim Al-‘Awadi, Nawaf Saif, and Mohammad Mubarak.
3.Pledge of allegiance text: "We declare our pledge of allegiance to the prince of believers and caliph of Muslims, Abu Bakr Ibrahim Bin Awwad Al-Qurashi Al-Hashemi Al-Husseini, pledging to selflessly hear and obey, in times of hardship and ease, and in times of delight and dislike. We pledge not to dispute the matter of those in authority except if we see obvious infidelity concerning which we have proof from Allah, and Allah is the Witness to our statement."
4.The publications of Al-Binali (born in 1984) reveals a great deal of arrogance and manifests an excessively self-centered attitude. His followers have stated more than once that a member participating in the forums under an alias excessively praised him, and then later, based on his writings, it turned out to be him.
5.We have counted-while conducting this investigative report-the nicknames used by Turki Al-Binali in various occasions. He have revealed some of them himself, such as: Abu Sufyan Al-Silmi, Abu Hammam Al-Athri, Abu Huthayfa Mohammed Bin Abedulrahman Al-Bahraini, Abu Hazm Al-Salafi, Abulhasan Al-Azdi, Hatem Al-Moqbel, Abu Al-Fidaa, Abu Dergham and other names. He has spoken of this in his book entitled "The Filth of Sects and Cults" (Zubalat Al-Melal Wal-Nihal): "Let it be known that the use of nicknames and aliases to conceal oneself from the tyrants and oppressors is a permissible action according to Sharia (...) Thus, I used to pun when someone asked me about my real name, and say: "I am Turki Bin Mubarak Al-Binali, and my nickname is Abu Sufyan Al-Silmi," and the truth is as I said: for this is the name my parents gave me, and this is the nickname I chose for myself." It is noteworthy to say here that when I used these nicknames and aliases, I never had referred my origin to anyone but my father, God forbid! Once I said: "Son of Abdulrahman (Bin Abdulrahman)" and another time I said: "Son of Abdulaziz (Bin Abdulaziz)"; and all people are the servants of Allah willingly or unwillingly. Once I said: "The Bahraini (Al-Bahraini); I was indeed born and raised in Bahrain. Another time I said: "The Athri (Al-Athri)"; I follow the religious school of Al-Athar, which follows the tracks (Athar) of the companions and their followers. Other times I said: "Hatem Al-Moqbel;" Moqbel is my great grandfather, and he is one of the highborn branches of the Al-Binali clan."
